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The present study aimed at identifying dysfunctions in brain networks that may underlie disturbed empathic
behavior in autism spectrum disorders (ASD). During functional magnetic resonance imaging, subjects were
asked to identify the emotional state observed in a facial stimulus (other-task) or to evaluate their own emotional
response (self-task). Behaviorally, ASD subjects performed equally to the control group during the other-task, but
showed less emotionally congruent responses in the self-task. Activations in brain regions related to theory of
mind were observed in both groups. Activations of the medial prefrontal cortex (MPFC) were located in dorsal
subregions in ASD subjects and in ventral areas in control subjects. During the self-task, ASD subjects activated
an additional network of frontal and inferior temporal areas. Frontal areas previously associated with the human
mirror system were activated in both tasks in control subjects, while ASD subjects recruited these areas during the
self-task only. Activations in the ventral MPFC may provide the basis for one’s “emotional bond” with other
persons’ emotions. Such atypical patterns of activation may underlie disturbed empathy in individuals with ASD.
Subjects with ASD may use an atypical cognitive strategy to gain access to their own emotional state in response
to other people’s emotions.
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INTRODUCTION
Empathy can be defined as the result of psychological
inferences about other persons’ mental and emotional
states allowing for socially appropriate emotional
responses. The ability to empathize entails both
emotional and cognitive components. On the emo-
tional side, empathy allows for emotional “contagion”
(Singer, 2006), that is, our ability to share other
people’s emotions. However, a crucial aspect of
empathy is that it includes self-referential emotional
cognition in order to evaluate the relationship
between other people’s emotional states and one’s
own emotions (Decety & Jackson, 2004; Schulte-
Rüther, Markowitsch, Fink, & Piefke, 2007). Cogni-
tive components of empathy are closely related to the
concepts of “theory of mind” (ToM) and “mentaliz-
ing” (Frith & Frith, 2003). ToM refers to the aware-
ness that mental states of other people may differ from
one’s own mental state. The ability to adopt others’
mental states and evaluate them from one’s own men-
tal perspective drives the ability to infer and predict
the intentions, beliefs, and feelings of other people
and allows for successful social interaction.
Difficulties in social interaction and social cogni-
tion are hallmarks of autism spectrum disorders
(ASD). It has been suggested that many aspects of the
observed problems in social interaction can be
explained by an ASD-specific deficit in ToM
(Baron-Cohen, Tager-Flusberg, & Cohen, 2000) and
empathy (Gillberg, 1992). It has repeatedly been
reported that individuals with ASD have profound
difficulties in gaining access to intentions, beliefs, and
emotions of other people (see Baron-Cohen et al.,
2000 for review). Even ASD subjects with high cog-
nitive abilities show impairments in diverse tasks with
ToM demands (Happé, 1994). Most previous studies
of ASD focused solely on the ability to infer other
people’s thoughts and intentions (for example using
false-belief tasks or tasks requiring the inference of
emotional states from faces), although the representa-
tion of both other and self may be altered in autism
(Rogers & Pennington, 1991). This idea is supported
by several behavioral findings. For example, ASD
subjects use fewer descriptions of their own mental or
emotional states when talking about personal everyday
experiences and daydreams (Hurlburt, Happe, &
Frith, 1994). Furthermore, ASD subjects do not show
the commonly observed memory advantage for self-
related materials or self-experienced events (Lombardo,
Barnes, Wheelwright, & Baron-Cohen, 2007; Millward,
Powell, Messer, & Jordan, 2000; Toichi et al., 2002)
and this effect might be intrinsically linked with mea-
sures of empathy (Lombardo et al., 2007). Finally,
many studies report the atypical use of first-person
pronouns in autistic children (e.g., Lee, Hobson, &
Chiat, 1994), suggesting an ASD-related delay of the
development of a self-concept.
Little is known about the neural bases of atypical
self-reference and empathy in individuals with ASD.
In control subjects, tasks requiring self-reference typi-
cally activate the medial prefrontal cortex (MPFC),
precuneus, and posterior cingulate cortex (PCC)
(Amodio & Frith, 2006; Cavanna & Trimble, 2006;
Mitchell, Macrae, & Banaji, 2006; Schulte-Rüther et al.,
2007). Interestingly, mentalizing about other persons
and self-referential cognition activate overlapping
regions in the MPFC (Amodio & Frith, 2006). These
findings have led to the suggestion that ToM may
involve “simulation” strategies, i.e., the understanding
of another person’s mind may be mirrored in first-
person experiences. In particular, affective mentaliz-
ing may strongly draw on self-reference (Mitchell et al.,
2006). In the context of emotional face-to-face situa-
tions, mirror mechanisms (in particular, mirror
neurons in the inferior frontal cortex; IFC, BA44/45)
have also been proposed as a neural basis of simula-
tion strategies (Carr, Iacoboni, Dubeau, Mazziotta, &
Lenzi, 2003; Dapretto et al., 2006; Schulte-Rüther et al.,
2007). Recent neuroimaging work revealed dysfunc-
tions of mirror mechanisms in children with ASD
(Dapretto et al., 2006), which may give rise to the per-
sisting social and empathic deficts in ASD (Williams,
Whiten, Suddendorf, & Perrett, 2001). However, pre-
vious approaches (Dapretto et al., 2006) used tasks
requiring the imitation and observation of emotional
faces which lacked the demand of explicit self-reference
and empathizing. Therefore, important behavioral and
neurofunctional aspects of self-related emotional pro-
cessing and its possible disturbance in ASD may have
been overlooked.
In the present study, we used a task similar to the
one applied in our previous functional magnetic reso-
nance imaging (fMRI) studies of empathy (Schulte-
Rüther et al., 2007; Schulte-Rüther, Markowitsch,
Shah, Fink, & Piefke, 2008). Subjects were asked to
empathize with facial expressions of emotions and
indicate either the emotional state observed in each
face (other-task) or their own emotional reaction to
the emotional facial expressions (self-task). Happy
and sad facial expressions were chosen as stimuli in
order to focus on the emergence of contagious emo-
tional responses as one possible outcome of empathic
processing. Importantly, our paradigm did not focus
on a simple perceptual decision about an emotional
face, but rather on the processes of explicit emotional
self-reference and emotion identification. The task
required interactive switching between the self- andBRAIN CORRELATES OF EMPATHY IN AUTISM 3
other-perspective and thus allowed for the construction
of an interpersonal context in which self- and other-
related empathic social cognition could emerge. On
the behavioral side, we expected ASD subjects to
show fewer contagious emotional responses. On the
neural level, we hypothesized to find decreased
activation in adults with ASD (compared to control
subjects) in the networks supporting ToM (MPFC,
temporoparietal regions, temporal poles), self-ref-
erential emotional cognition (MPFC, precuneus/
PCC), and frontal components (IFC, BA44/45) of the
human mirror system (hMS) during both self and
other conditions (in comparison to a control-task).
Aberrant neural activation of ASD subjects during the
self-task (in comparison to a control-task) was
expected to reflect atypical strategies of assessing
one’s own emotions in the absence of contagious
emotional responses.
METHODS
Participants
Eighteen male adults (mean age ± SD = 27.40 ± 9.34)
with a diagnosis of ASD and 18 male control subjects
(mean age ± SD = 25.05 ± 6.69) without a history of
neurological or psychiatric disease and matched for
age and IQ took part in this study; 14 participants in
each group were included in the final fMRI data
analysis. Only participants with a general IQ of at
least 85 (as assessed with the German version of the
WAIS-III) were included. ASD subjects were diag-
nosed by experienced clinicians for Asperger’s syn-
drome (n = 7) or high-functioning autism (n = 7)
according to the criteria of ICD-10 and DSM-IV
using a semi-structured diagnostic interview. For all
participants, diagnosis was confirmed with the
Autism Diagnostic Observation Schedule (ADOS)
conducted by trained examiners (EG, IK-B). Further-
more, all participants completed the Autism Spectrum
Questionnaire (AQ) and the Empathy Questionnaire
(EQ) (Baron-Cohen, Wheelwright, Robinson, &
Woodbury-Smith, 2005). Demographic and clinical
data are summarized in Table 1. To exclude con-
founding psychiatric and neurological disorders, ASD
and control subjects completed the Brief Symptom
Inventory (Derogatis, 1993), and a brief demographic
and medical anamnesis was performed. Subjects who
scored above threshold for clinically relevant psychiatric
problems were excluded from the study. At the time of
examination, two subjects of the ASD group were medi-
cated (Subject 1: Venlafaxin® 150 mg, Mirtazapin®
15 mg; Subject 2: Risperdal® 4 mg, Eunerpan®
50 mg). The study was approved by the local ethics
committee (according to the Declaration of Helsinki),
and all subjects gave written informed consent prior
to participation.
Experimental paradigm
Subjects were asked to empathize with emotional
facial expressions presented on a computer screen by
“feeling into” the depicted person and either to judge
the emotional state of each face (other-task), or to
report the emotions elicited in themselves by the
emotional faces (self-task). The instructions were as
follows. Other-task: “Try to empathize with the
depicted person. For each face that appears on the
screen you should decide how this person feels.” Self-
task: “Try to empathize with the depicted person. For
each face that appears on the screen you should
decide how you feel yourself when you look at that
TABLE 1 
Demographic and clinical characteristics of the ASD and control sample
ASD group CS group
T (df = 26) p (2-tailed) Measure Mean SD Range Mean SD Range
Age (years) 27.4 9.3 18–48 25.1 6.7 19–46 −0.764 .452
G-IQ 106.6 10.5 85–125 112.1 10.4 89–129 1.388 .177
V-IQ 112.9 12.9 94–136 113.8 10.1 93–134 0.195 .847
P-IQ 99.4 15.1 78–120 108.1 11.3 86–125 1.715 .098
AQ 33.6 10.2 15.7 4.4 −6.054 <.001
EQ 22.9 14.4 37.6 10.6 3.080 <.01
Notes: ASD = autism spectrum disorders; CS = control subjects; G-IQ = general intelligence quotient; V-IQ = verbal
intelligence quotient; P-IQ = performance intelligence quotient; AQ = autism spectrum quotient; EQ = empathy quotient.
IQ values were assessed with the German version of the WAIS-III. Only participants with a general IQ of at least 85 were
included in the study. Student’s t-tests for independent samples were applied to test for statistical differences between
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face.” To reduce potential social desirability bias,
subjects were explicitly told that there were no correct
or wrong answers in the self-task. Response options
were “sad,” “neutral,” or “happy.” For the self- and
the other-task, stimulus faces had either a happy or a
sad emotional expression with either high or low
intensity. A perceptual decision on the width of neu-
tral faces was included as a control condition using
“thin,” “normal,” or “wide” as response options. Only
neutral faces were used in the control condition to
avoid the elicitation of implicit emotional responses
during the control-task. We did not include a further
low-level baseline (e.g. resting condition) because
comparison of experimental tasks against this kind of
baseline may yield ambiguous results (Morcom &
Fletcher, 2007). Importantly, brain activity during
resting conditions may be associated with self-referential
processing (Gusnard, Akbudak, Shulman, & Raichle,
2001) and therefore provides a non-optimal control
condition for social cognitive processes such as empa-
thy. The three experimental tasks (self-task, other-
task, and control-task) alternated blockwise in a pseu-
dorandomized counterbalanced order. Twelve blocks
of each task were presented, resulting in 36 blocks.
Each block contained 6 trials, resulting in a total of
192 trials (64 trials per task; see Figure 1 for the exact
time course of stimulus presentation). Across self-
and other-blocks, intensity (high, low) and quality of
emotion (happy, sad) were counterbalanced. A
blocked design was chosen to maximize design effi-
ciency for the detection of differences between tasks.
Furthermore, as initial pilot testing indicated that
switching between tasks on a trial-by trial basis was
very difficult even for control subjects, a blocked
presentation of tasks was considered as the best choice
for our paradigm. A block contained stimuli of either
low or high intensity. Low-intensity stimuli were
included in the stimulus set to avoid potential ceiling
effects. Using only high-intensity stimuli might have
rendered the task too easy for controls as well as for
ASD subjects. Emotion categories were mixed within
blocks, that is, stimulus faces of the same emotion
category did not appear more then three times in a
row and each emotion appeared at least twice within a
block. This procedure was chosen (i) in order to avoid
habituation effects related to empathizing with persons
displaying the same emotion category; (ii) to prevent
subjects from adopting response strategies related to
predictable stimulus sequences. Subjects responded
with button-presses using three fingers of their right
hand while the stimuli were on the screen.
Responses were collected for each presented stimu-
lus face and were counted from 150 ms post stimu-
lus-onset until the onset of the next stimulus face. The
software Presentation 9 (Neurobehavioral Systems,
Albany, CA; www.neurobs.com) was used for stimu-
lus presentation and response collection. Prior to scan-
ning, subjects were trained on the experimental tasks
to ensure that they were able to respond within the
required time window. After the fMRI experiment,
subjects were questioned about their strategies used to
perform the tasks and other performance-related
aspects. Of the 18 ASD and 18 control subjects (CS)
who initially participated in the study, 4 participants
in each group were not able to describe the difference
between the self- and the other-task and indicated that
they had always responded “according to how the
other person felt” without any reference to their own
feelings. These were not included in any analysis,
resulting in a final sample of 28 participants (14 ASD,
14 CS) which entered in the fMRI analyses.
Stimuli
Stimulus faces were constructed using FaceGen 3.1
(Singular Inversions, Vancouver, Canada). Photos of
volunteers showing a neutral facial expression were
transformed into three-dimensional representations
that were subsequently morphed for quality and inten-
sity of emotional expressions. According to estab-
lished conventions of the Facial Action Coding
System (FACS; Ekman & Friesen, 1978), each face
was morphed to a male adult with a happy and a sad
expression (with either high or low intensity), and a
neutral expression. Only male stimulus pictures were
used because all participants were male and empathiz-
ing is facilitated with perceived similarity to the
observed person (see, e.g., Preston & de Waal, 2002).
Furthermore, possible confounds related to differ-
ences in empathizing with men or women could be
excluded. Validity of emotional expressions was
corroborated in a behavioral pilot study. Ten male
volunteers rated faces (i) for emotion category
(happy, sad, neutral) and intensity (high, low). A total
of 72 faces were included in the final stimulus set.
These faces had a mean ratio of correct responses for
the identification of emotion categories (88.5% ± 17.5
SD) and for the sorting into emotion intensity categories
(75.1% ± 19.8 SD).
Eye movement data
Stimuli were presented with a binocular goggle
system (Avotec Inc., Stuart, FL) which allowed for
simultaneous eye-movement recording (iView X,
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at a sampling rate of 50 Hz and a resolution of 600 ×
800 pixels. Due to technical problems, eye movement
data were not available for seven participants. Eye
movement data from the remaining 21 participants
(9 of 14 ASD, 12 of 14 CS) were further processed
with eye-movement data analysis software (ILAB
3.6.0, Gitelman, 2002). Eye blinks were filtered out
and fixations during the presentation of facial stimuli
were determined (minimum duration of 50 ms and
no consecutive dispersion of more than 20 pixels).
Mean durations of fixation for each experimental con-
dition within predefined regions of interest (eyes,
mouth, and whole face region) were determined for
each participant.
MR technical parameters
MR imaging was accomplished on a 1.5-T Avanto
MR scanner (Siemens, Erlangen, Germany) using a
Figure 1. Time course of stimulus presentation during the scanning session. Subjects were instructed to empathize with the person presented
on the screen and to (A) identify the emotional state observed in the face (other-task) or (B) evaluate their own emotional response to that face
(self-task). As a control-task (C) a perceptual decision on the width of neutral faces was used. Each block (19.2 s) was preceded by an instruc-
tion cue (3 s) and comprised six stimulus faces (each 2.5 s), separated by a fixation cross (jittered duration: 0.45 – 0.95 s). Instruction cues were
pictures of a finger pointing towards the subject (self-task), pointing away from the subject (other-task) or three dots of increasing width
(control-task). Each of n = 72 individual faces was presented once displaying a happy expression, once displaying a sad expression and once
displaying a neutral expression.6 SCHULTE-RÜTHER ET AL.
standard head coil. For functional imaging, gradient-
echo, echoplanar T2*-weighted images (EPI) were
acquired (TE = 60 ms, TR = 3000ms, α = 90°, FOV =
200mm, voxel size = 3.1 × 3.1 × 4 mm3, matrix size =
64  × 64, 30 transversal slices, slice acquisition:
ascending) in one session (∼14 min). Anatomical
images were acquired using a T1-weighted 3D mag-
netization-prepared, rapid acquisition gradient echo
(MP-RAGE) pulse sequence (TE = 3.93 ms, TR =
2200 ms, α = 15°, FOV = 256 mm, voxel size = 1 × 1
× 1 mm3, matrix size = 256 × 256, 160 sagittal slices,
slice thickness = 1 mm).
Image processing and data analysis
Twenty-eight subjects (14 CS, 14 ASD) were
included in the final sample for the analysis of fMRI
data. Functional volumes were analyzed with SPM5
(Wellcome Department of Imaging Neuroscience,
London; www.fil.ion.ucl.ac.uk/spm) implemented in
MATLAB 7 (The Mathworks, Inc., Natick, MA). The
first four volumes of each functional time-series were
discarded to allow the MR signal to reach a steady
state. The remaining 285 images were realigned using
rigid body transformation, normalized into the Mon-
treal Neurological Institute (MNI) coordinate space
and resampled at 2 × 2 × 2 mm3. Normalization
parameters were determined by applying the “unified
segmentation” routine (Ashburner & Friston, 2005) to
each individual subject’s mean EPI image. This rou-
tine gives normalization parameters that are at least as
precise as the standard normalization routine in
SPM5, but may even provide more precision due to
the parallel and recursive segmentation and normali-
zation procedure. Anatomical scans were normalized
into MNI space using the same method. Prior to stat-
istical analysis, functional volumes were smoothed
with an 8 × 8 × 8 mm3 Gaussian kernel (full width
half maximum) to compensate for residual variations
in individual anatomy and to meet the requirements of
the Gaussian random fields theory.
Boxcar functions of 19.2 s duration (corresponding
to the onset of each experimental block, starting with
the first presentation of a face) were convolved with a
model of the hemodynamic response (canonical HRF
implemented in SPM) and its first-order temporal
derivative (to compensate for timing differences in
slice acquisition). Movement parameters were
included as additional regressors of no interest. A
high-pass cut-off filter of 128 s was used to account
for low-frequency drifts in the imaging data. To handle
within-subject autocorrelations an approximate AR(1)
model was estimated at omnibus F-significant voxels
(p < .001), used globally over the whole brain. Param-
eter estimates of the resulting general linear model were
calculated for each voxel and each regressor.
For population inference, the contrast estimates for
the simple effect of each experimental condition were
taken to the second level (using the first regressor of
the first-level HRF model as an estimate of response
height) and a random effects analysis was performed
(mixed ANOVA, factors: condition × group × sub-
ject). Departures from sphericity assumptions were
accommodated using the non-sphericity correction in
SPM5 (modeling of variance components). For this
procedure, unequal variance was assumed for all factors;
non-independence was assumed for the factor condi-
tion (repeated measures). Specific effects at each
voxel were tested by applying appropriate linear con-
trasts to the parameter estimates. Experimental condi-
tions containing high- and low-intensity stimuli were
modeled separately. However, since initial assess-
ment of results related to stimulus intensity did not
reveal differential effects, high- and low-intensity
trials were collapsed for subsequent data analysis.
Further analysis related to group differences in empa-
thizing focused on the separate comparison of both
empathizing tasks with the control-task.
To constrict the analysis of group differences to
brain regions that play a role in empathizing, we used
the respective within-group contrasts as functional
regions of interest for the assessment of interactions
with the factor group (i.e., group differences of the
self- or other-task relative to the control-task). These
analyses were performed using the SPMs of a within-
group contrast as an inclusive mask (threshold used
for masking: p < .01) and as a functional region of
interest (ROI) for the interaction contrast. The statist-
ical threshold for both within- and between-group
comparisons (interactions) was set to p < .05, cor-
rected for multiple comparisons at the cluster level
(for cluster-level inference, SPMs were thresholded at
p < .001, voxel level). For a-priori anatomical ROIs,
small volume corrections were applied across each
respective region (p < .05, voxel level, family-wise
error (FWE) correction). Anatomical ROIs were con-
structed using the software WFU Pickatlas (Maldjian,
Laurienti, Burdette & Kraft, 2003). Using AAL-labels
(Tzourio-Mazoyer et al., 2002), the following ROIs
were defined according to our a-priori hypotheses
(see “Introduction”): IFC (BA44/45) (inferior frontal
gyrus pars opercularis and triangularis), MPFC (supe-
rior frontal cortex pars medialis, middle frontal gyrus
pars orbitalis, anterior cingulate cortex, gyrus rectus),
STS (superior temporal gyrus, middle temporal
gyrus), temporal pole (temporal pole: superior temporal
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precuneus/PCC (precuneus, posterior cingulate cortex).
A ROI of the TPJ was constructed using the coordi-
nates of rTPJ given in a recent meta-analysis on
empathy, ToM, and attention (Decety and Lamm,
2007) and the corresponding mirrored coordinate of
lTPJ, each surrounded by a 10 mm sphere. These
ROIs were used for small volume corrections in SPM.
Peak activated voxels resulting from these analyses
were further inspected in a whole brain analysis to
ensure that these voxels represented peak activations
within the respective ROI and not merely an overlap-
ping activation cluster from neighboring regions.
To assess correlations between brain activation and
individual empathic abilities (as measured by the EQ),
whole brain regression models were constructed using
individual EQ values and first-level contrast estimates
of either the other-control or the self-control compari-
son. Areas showing positive correlations between
brain activation and EQ values across all subjects
were identified within brain regions that were reliably
activated in the respective contrast of the ANOVA
analysis (see above), either for ASD or for CS subjects.
These analyses were performed using the combined
SPMs (logical OR) of both within group contrasts of
the ANOVA analysis as an inclusive mask (threshold
used for masking p < .01) and as a ROI for the regres-
sion analyses. The statistical threshold for the regres-
sion analyses was set to p < .05, corrected for multiple
comparisons at the cluster level (for cluster-level
inference, SPMs were thresholded at p < .005, voxel
level).
Localization of activations
SPMT maps resulting from the group analysis were
superimposed onto a group mean MR image calcu-
lated from the normalized anatomical T1-images of
each subject (see above). MNI coordinates of the local
maxima within areas of significant relative changes in
neural activity were determined and anatomically
localized by comparing activation maps superim-
posed on the anatomical group mean brain with a
standard atlas of brain anatomy (Duvernoy, 1999). In
addition, an SPM toolbox (Eickhoff et al., 2005) was
applied which allows for the integration of probabilis-
tic cytoarchitectonic maps of the brain and functional
neuroimaging data.
Analysis of behavioral data
Behavioral data were analyzed with the software
package SPSS 15 (SPSS Inc., Chicago, IL). For each
experimental condition and each subject, percentage
of correct (i.e., correct attribution of the emotional
state of a stimulus face in the other-task) and congruent
responses (i.e., responses during the self-task mirroring
the emotional state of a stimulus face), as well as
mean reaction times (RTs) were calculated. Since
Kolmogorov-Smirnoff tests indicated normal distri-
bution of all variables of interest, parametric analyses
(mixed ANOVAs and t-tests) were employed to test
for statistically significant differences between groups
and experimental conditions. For all behavioral analy-
ses, significance was determined using two-tailed
testing.
RESULTS
Behavioral data
RTs were analyzed with a 2 × 2 × 2 mixed ANOVA
(task × intensity × group) and a 3 × 2 mixed ANOVA
(task × group). RTs were faster for the other- than for
the self-task, F(1, 26) = 6.94, MSE = 21.95, p < .05,
and faster for the high than the low emotion intensity
stimuli, F(1, 26) = 22.65, MSE = 31.06, p < .001.
Interactions and the main effect of group were nonsig-
nificant. RTs of the three tasks differed, F(2, 52) =
3.339, MSE = 59.10, p < .05, but self- and other-task
did not differ significantly from the control-task,
respectively (post-hoc pairwise comparisons, p >
.262). Interactions and the main effect of group were
also nonsignificant.
For the analyses of correct/congruent responses, 2
× 2 × 2 mixed ANOVAS were calculated (task ×
intensity × group).The number of correct responses
for the other-task was higher than the number of con-
gruent responses for the self-task, F(1, 26) = 12.83,
MSE = 0.085, p < .001, and higher for the high emo-
tional intensity than the low emotional intensity
stimuli, F(1, 26) = 104.73, MSE = 0.037, p < .001.
There was also a main effect of group, F(1, 26) =
5.936, MSE = 0.125, p < .05, and a significant task ×
group interaction, F(1, 26) = 7.78, MSE = 0.085, p <
.010. These effects were due to a group difference of
congruent responses in the self-task (t-test for inde-
pendent samples, t = 2.906, df = 15.47, p < .05) but no
differences in the other-task (t = 0.159, df = 22.931,
p = .875) (see Figure 2). Other interactions were not
significant. In the other- and in the self-task, errors or
incongruent responses were mostly due to the selection
of “neutral” instead of the target emotion. Selection of
the opposite emotional state (“sad” for happy faces or
“happy” for sad faces) occurred on average in less
than 2.3% of the trials. A 2 × 2 × 2 ANOVA (intensity
× emotion × group) of the number of such choices
revealed no significant effects or interactions. Across8 SCHULTE-RÜTHER ET AL.
experimental groups, mean congruent responses
during the self-task were correlated with EQ values
(Spearman’s rho = .414, p < .028), confirming the
interrelationship between empathic abilities and
performance in the experimental task. To relate
performance in the self-task (as measured by the per-
centage of congruent responses) to performance in the
other task (as measured by the percentage of correct
responses) a correlation analysis was performed.
Behavioral data for the self- and the other-task were
significantly correlated for control subjects (r = .610, p
< .01), but not for ASD subjects (r = .163, p < .289).
Eye movement data
Unlike previous studies reporting atypical visual
scanning patterns in ASD for emotional faces (Dalton,
Nacewicz, Alexander, & Davidson, 2007), we did not
find differences between groups in the time spent on
fixating the face, the eye, or the mouth region during
any experimental condition (t-tests for independent
samples; t(19) < 0.707, p > .489). Neuroimaging data
are thus not confounded by aberrant fixation patterns
that may occur in ASD subjects (see also Dapretto
et al, 2006). Eye movement data are summarized in
Table 2.
FMRI data
In the following paragraphs, we report fMRI results
for each group separately, as well as results of the dir-
ect statistical comparisons between groups (interac-
tion analyses). Note that differences in the activation
patterns of the respective group results are not indica-
tive of a difference between groups, unless significant
in the direct comparison, and that post-hoc exclusion
of medicated subjects from the fMRI data analysis did
not change the pattern of results reported here.
Other-task vs. control-task
In control subjects, significant increases in neural
activity were observed in bilateral medial cortical
structures (ventral portions of the MPFC (vMPFC),
precuneus/PCC), the left lingual gyrus, bilateral mid-
dle temporal gyrus/superior temporal sulcus (STS),
left temporoparietal junction (TPJ), and right IFC
(BA44/45). ASD subjects showed increased neural
activation in the dorsal part of the left MPFC
(dMPFC), bilateral precuneus, right middle temporal
gyrus/STS and left TPJ. There was no significant acti-
vation in ASD subjects in the right IFC even at an
uncorrected threshold (p < .001, voxel level). Signifi-
cant differences in brain activation between groups
could be revealed in the direct comparison (interac-
tion analysis). Control subjects showed differential
activation in the vMPFC and precuneus/PCC while
Figure 2. A. Emotional responses in control subjects (CS, n = 14)
and subjects with autism spectrum disorders (ASD, n = 14) in the
self- and the other-task. Average correct responses during the other-
task (i.e., correct attribution of the emotional state of a stimulus
face) and congruent responses during the self-task (i.e., responses
mirroring the emotional state of a stimulus face) in control subjects
and ASD subjects depending on task (self, other) and the intensity
of the emotional expression (high, low). Error bars index the stand-
ard error of means (SEM). Note that the label “correct” is used only
for the other-task as the emotional state of the observed person is
defined by an objective criterion (facial expression, validated in a
behavioral pilot-study). B. RTs during the control-, self- and other-
tasks. Average RTs of correct responses during the control-task,
other-task, and self-task. For the self- and other-tasks, separate RTs
are given for stimuli with high and low emotional intensity. Since
ANOVAs neither indicated a significant main effect of group nor
significant interactions, RTs were collapsed across groups. Error
bars index the standard error of means (SEM).BRAIN CORRELATES OF EMPATHY IN AUTISM 9
there was differential activation in the dMPFC in
ASD subjects (see Table 3).
Self-task versus control-task
In the control group, increased neural activity was
evident in areas similar to those observed for the
other-task. However, additional activations were
located in the dMPFC, left IFC, left TPJ, and right
cerebellum. In contrast, ASD subjects showed
increases in neural activity which extended into wide-
spread frontal areas (left superior frontal gyrus, bilat-
eral middle frontal gyrus, bilateral IFC), bilateral TPJ,
inferior temporal gyrus (ITG), and temporal pole. Sig-
nificant differences in brain activation between
groups could be revealed in the direct comparison
(interaction analysis). ASD subjects showed differen-
tial activation in the right IFC (pars orbitalis, BA47),
right dMPFC, right middle frontal gyrus, and the right
TPJ (see Table 3). No significant differential activations
were observed for the control group at the pre-defined
statistical threshold. At a more liberal, exploratory
threshold (p < .05, uncorrected) the biggest cluster of
activation emerged in the vMPFC.
Conjunction of other-task vs. control-task and self-
task vs. control-task
The conjunction of the two experimental tasks
(compared to the control-task) revealed activations
bilaterally in the vMPFC and precuneus/PCC, right
STS, and left TPJ in control subjects. In ASD sub-
jects, conjoint activation could be observed in bilat-
eral precuneus/PCC and left dMPFC. Using a ROI
analysis, a trend towards significance could be
observed for a cluster in right STS (p < .0689, FWE-
corrected).
Correlations of brain activation and empathy
Whole brain regression analyses yielded signific-
ant correlations between empathic abilities and brain
activation during the other task in the vMPFC (MNI
coordinates of peak activated voxel: [2, 44, −18]) and
precuneus bilaterally (MNI coordinates of peak acti-
vated voxel: [−6, −46, 48], see Figure 3). Whole brain
analyses were performed across the whole group.
However, to elucidate potential group differences in
correlations, individual contrast estimates were
extracted at peak activated voxels and tested for a
positive correlation with EQ values separately for
ASD and CS subjects. These analyses revealed signi-
ficant correlations for each group in the vMPFC
(ASD: R = 0.575, p < .05; CS: R = 0.538, p < .05) and
precuneus (ASD: R = 0.725, p < .01; CS: R = 0.598, p
< .05). The whole brain regression analysis of EQ and
the self-task did not reveal foci of activation at the
selected threshold. However, using the same pre-
cuneus and vMPFC coordinates reported above, we
found significant correlations between activation in
the self-task and EQ values in both vMPFC (R =
0.449, p < .01) and precuneus (R = 0.387, p < .05)
across all participants. Separate correlation analyses
for each group yielded marginally significant results
for the precuneus in both groups (CS: R = 0.428, p =
.0633; ASD: R = 0.452, p = .0522) and for the vMPFC
only in control subjects (CS: R = 0.398, p = .0801;
ASD: R = 0.289, p = .1578).
DISCUSSION
The paradigm of the present study is unique in that
it enabled us to assess emotional self- and other-related
TABLE 2 
Eye movement data
ASD (n = 9) CS (n = 12)
T (df = 19) p (2-tailed) Task Mean SD Mean SD
Fixation on eye region
Self-task 883 596 775 658 0.390 .701
Other-task 791 532 804 621 −0.049 .962
Fixation on mouth region
Self-task 432 614 428 298 0.017 .986
Other-task 794 609 405 291 0.444 .662
Fixation on face region
Self-task 1963 337 1909 174 0.473 .641
Other-task 1961 334 1941 139 0.185 .855
Notes: Mean time and standard deviation (in ms) spent on fixating the eye, mouth, or whole face region,
separately for groups and self- and other-task. Data were obtained during the fMRI scanning session.10
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processing in ASD subjects during an interactive
empathic situation. Other studies have examined
emotional self- or other-related social cognition in
ASD using a paradigm that required the recognition
of one’s own face (Uddin et al., 2008) or abstract
evaluation of trait adjectives (Kennedy &
Courchesne, 2008), or have examined resting-state
conditions that are considered to be associated with
self-referential processing (Kennedy, Redcay, &
Courchesne, 2006). To our knowledge, this is the
first fMRI study that examines subjects with ASD
in an explicit empathizing task. Previous imaging
studies on empathy in ASD either focused on brain
activation related to imitation and observation of
facial expressions as indirect measures of empathy
(Dapretto et al., 2006) or used affective pictures to
induce emotion and correlate respective brain acti-
vation with empathy questionnaires (Silani et al.,
2008).
The present study aimed at identifying brain
dysfunctions underlying atypical self- and other-
related emotional processing in adults with ASD in
the context of facial expressions of emotions. With
respect to behavioral performance, there were no
significant differences in RTs between ASD sub-
jects and control subjects for any experimental
condition. It is thus unlikely that differences in
neural activations are related to domain-general
performance deficits (such as differences in per-
ceptual processing speed). Moreover, the percent-
age of correct responses in the other-task did not
differ between groups, suggesting that ASD sub-
jects were able to infer other persons’ emotions
from facial displays. In contrast to previous studies
(Dalton et al., 2007), we did not observe
differences in eye-movements and visual scanning
patterns between groups. One can thus exclude that
our neuroimaging results are confounded by aber-
rant fixation patterns in ASD subjects. Consistent
with previous findings of reduced emotional conta-
gion (Scambler, Hepburn, Rutherford, Wehner, &
Rogers, 2007) and empathy (Baron-Cohen &
Wheelwright, 2004), individuals with ASD
reported fewer contagious emotional responses
during the self task. Note that incongruent
responses were mostly “neutral” responses. Choos-
ing an opposite emotion was rare, suggesting an
absence of emotional contagion rather than the
emergence of inappropriate incongruent emotional
responses. The finding that in control subjects the
amount of emotional contagion was correlated
with the correct identification of emotional expres-
sions suggests that these two processes are closely
interrelated components of empathic processing.
Brain networks involved in ToM and 
empathy
The MPFC, STS, and TPJ, which are typically involved
in ToM tasks (Frith & Frith, 2003), were activated in
both controls and ASD subjects. Our data thus corrobo-
rate earlier studies demonstrating that ToM areas are
recruited in face-to-face situations where emotional
states are inferred from facial displays (Baron-Cohen
et al., 1999; Schulte-Rüther et al., 2007). In contrast to
previous reports (Castelli, Frith, Happé, & Frith, 2002;
Happé et al., 1996), we did not observe significant
hypoactivation of the ToM network in subjects with
ASD. Our data suggest that individuals with ASD appear
to activate ToM-related brain regions when they receive
the instruction to intentionally empathize. Correspond-
ingly, Wang, Lee, Sigman, and Dapretto (2007) reported
that the explicit instruction to focus on the social con-
tents of stimuli may diminish hypoactivation of ToM
areas in ASD subjects. In our experiment, ASD subjects
showed increased activation in the right TPJ during the
self-task, indicating that ASD subjects may use different
cognitive resources to evaluate and gain access to their
own emotional state in response to other persons’ emo-
tions. Various neuroimaging studies have demonstrated
that the right TPJ is typically associated with the self–
other distinction (Decety & Grezes, 2006; Schulte-
Rüther et al., 2007; Vogeley & Fink, 2003) and plays a
prominent role in differentiating between self-produced
actions and actions caused by others (Blakemore &
Frith, 2003). For example, during movement observation
this brain region is associated with the awareness of not
being the source of the action (Farrer & Frith, 2002), and
it is modulated by the degree of mismatch between self-
experienced and observed actions (Farrer et al., 2003).
Thus, the observed differential activation of the TPJ in
ASD subjects in our study may depend on a dysfunc-
tional coupling of diminished “mirroring” of observed
emotions and a state of enhanced cognitive distinction
between one’s own emotions and those expressed by the
facial stimuli. Such enhanced distinction between one-
self and other persons may contribute to a diminished
capability of showing contagious emotional reactions.
Other authors have argued that overlapping regions of
the right TPJ are implicated in social cognitive process-
ing (such as empathy and ToM) but also in lower-level
attentional processing and that such attentional process-
ing might be a prerequisite for higher-level social cogni-
tion (Decety and Lamm, 2007). For example, it has been
suggested that the right TPJ is part of a ventral attention
network which is involved in directing attention
from internal states to external stimuli, and vice
versa (Corbetta, Patel, & Shulman, 2008). During the
self-task, the continuous shift between the assessment ofBRAIN CORRELATES OF EMPATHY IN AUTISM 13
one’s own emotions and the observation of emotional
faces may thus account for the activation of the TPJ in
both groups. It might be speculated that for ASD sub-
jects, such switching processes need more attentional
resources than in control subjects (as indicated by
stronger activation of the TPJ and the ventral inferior
frontal cortex) because of their lack of emotional conta-
gion (i.e., their internal emotional state was more often
incongruent with the observed emotional faces).
Using a similar paradigm, Schulte-Rüther et al.
(2008) showed that males (in comparison to females)
also show enhanced recruitment of the TPJ during the
assessment of their own emotions in an empathic situ-
ation. Furthermore, emotional reactions to the observed
faces were less pronounced in males than in females.
Taken together, our results demonstrate that gender dif-
ferences in these brain functions and behavior show sim-
ilarities with ASD-related neurofunctional and
behavioral deviations. The data thus provide preliminary
support for theories that relate ASD to an extreme
variant of a typical “male brain” (Baron-Cohen,
Knickmeyer, & Belmonte, 2005).
Medial prefrontal cortex
The MPFC has been implicated in diverse emotional
and non-emotional social tasks. Recently, it has been
proposed that the MPFC can be segregated into neu-
rofunctional submodules along a caudal–rostral axis
(Amodio & Frith, 2006). According to the model, the
most ventral parts of the MPFC (approximately
defined by z < 2) are involved in autonomic and vis-
ceral aspects of emotional responses (Koski & Paus,
2000), which are typically associated with the moni-
toring of the value of future outcomes. In contrast,
dorsal (posterior rostral) MPFC areas are considered
to be primarily engaged in action monitoring and the
evaluation of observed actions. Moreover, Amodio
and Frith (2006) argue that processing within the
MPFC proceeds from the most dorsal and most ven-
tral parts towards an anterior rostral transition zone. In
this transition zone, more abstract metacognitive rep-
resentations supporting self-reference and mentaliz-
ing are supposed to be implemented. Overall, this
model is in accordance with the idea that social cogni-
tive judgments rely primarily on the dMPFC while the
vMPFC is more related to self-referential emotional
cognition (D’Argembeau et al., 2007; Mitchell et al.,
2006; Schulte-Rüther et al., 2007). Consistently, a
large number of neuroimaging studies have impli-
cated the vMPFC in self-referential thinking (e.g.,
Macrae, Moran, Heatherton, Banfield, & Kelley,
2004; Schmitz, Kawahara-Baccus, & Johnson, 2004),
especially in the context of emotions (Moran, Macrae,
Heatherton, Wyland, & Kelley, 2006). Since the
vMPFC is strongly interconnected with emotion pro-
cessing areas including the amygdala, ventral striatum,
and orbitofrontal cortex (Ongur, Ferry, & Price,
2003), it is conceivable that self-related cognition,
emotion processing, and external socially significant
cues are integrated in this region. Such integration
may allow for one’s “emotional bonding” with other
persons in empathic situations. This view is corrobo-
rated by our finding of a positive correlation between
empathic abilities and activation in the vMPFC during
empathizing (see Figure 3).
Note, however, that recent meta-analyses of brain
imaging studies investigating theory of mind (Spreng,
Mar, & Kim, 2009) and experience of emotion (Kober
et al., 2008) demonstrated similar activations of
ventral and dorsal portions of the MPFC during tasks
that require emotional social cognition. These find-
ings speak against the view of a clear-cut ventral/
dorsal neurofunctional segregation within the MPFC.
However, one needs to consider that many studies
included in the meta-analysis (Kober et al., 2008)
used facial expressions or pictures showing complex
social scenes (e.g. the International Affective Picture
System, IAPS) as stimulus materials which may
evoke both empathic reactions and ToM reasoning.
Furthermore, ToM paradigms typically contain not
only cognitive, but also affective components.
Lesion studies are better suited than meta-analyses
to differentiate between effects of emotional process-
ing and ToM within subregions of the MPFC. It has
recently been demonstrated that lesions of the vMPFC
selectively affect performance in ToM tasks that
require the empathic understanding of other people’s
feelings (e.g., detecting “faux-pas” situations), but do
not impair cognitive aspects of ToM (e.g., under-
standing of second-order false belief; Shamay-
Tsoory, Tomer, Berger, Goldsher, & Sharon-Peretz,
2005; Stone, Baron-Cohen, & Knight, 1998). Moreover,
patients with vMPFC lesions rate themselves as having
less empathic ability than other people (Shamay-
Tsoory, Sharon-Peretz, & Perry, 2009).
Our fMRI results show further evidence for the
concept of a neurofunctional segregation in the MPFC
in that we demonstrate a dissociation of activation
along the caudal–rostral axis in the comparison of
control subjects and subjects with ASD during
empathizing (see Figure 4). These data underline
the notion of a particular role of the vMPFC in
affective ToM and empathy. Across groups, there
is activation in the anterior rostral MPFC, the part
of MPFC that has been associated with diverse
abstract mentalizing tasks. However, the peak of14 SCHULTE-RÜTHER ET AL.
activation was located more dorsally in subjects
with ASD and more ventrally in control subjects. In
the direct comparison between ASD subjects and
control subjects, the activation patterns show a clear
dissociation, with differential dMPFC recruitment in
ASD subjects and differential vMPFC recruitment
in control subjects. This brain activation pattern is
paralleled by a reduction of contagious emotional
Figure 3. Covariation of brain activation and empathic abilities. Brain activity during the other task (vs. high-level baseline) correlated with
individual EQ values (Baron-Cohen and Wheelwright, 2004) across all participants. SPM is thresholded at p < .005 (voxel-level). Circled clus-
ters are significant at p < .05, corrected for multiple comparisons at the cluster level. Scatterplots illustrate the correlation in the peak activated
voxels of both significant clusters in vMPFC and precuneus, respectively. Solid lines represent the linear best fit.
Figure 4. Brain activity in the MPFC during the self- and other-task (relative to the control-task). In the other-task, activation was located in
the dMPFC in ASD-subjects, while the control subjects (CS) activated portions of the vMPFC. Direct between-group contrast (CS > ASD;
ASD > CS) corroborated this pattern of activations. Likewise, in the self-task, the peak of activation for ASD subjects was restricted to the
dMPFC while activations extended into the vMPFC in control subjects. In the figure, activations are superimposed on the anatomical group
mean image. For illustrative purposes, SPMs are thresholded at p < .001, uncorrected. Note however that all depicted peaks of activation were
significant when correction for multiple comparisons was applied (see Table 2), except for the comparison control > ASD in the self-task
which is shown here at an exploratory level (p < .05 uncorrected).BRAIN CORRELATES OF EMPATHY IN AUTISM 15
responses in subjects with ASD. In controls, empa-
thizing with other persons is thus likely to be trig-
gered by emotional self-referential cognition
instantiated in vMPFC regions, whereas in ASD
subjects cognitive components of ToM (e.g., detection
of intentions) and action monitoring (relying on
dMPFC regions) may predominate. As the vMPFC
plays an important role for monitoring the value of
future outcomes (Amodio and Frith, 2006), it is con-
ceivable that ASD subjects lack the direct link
between metacognitive representations and the emo-
tional value of social interactions. Clinical observa-
tions indicating that individuals with ASD can
develop ToM abilities at an abstract level, but lack
intuitive ToM abilities in dyadic social interactions
(Bowler, 1992; Happé, 1994), are consistent with this
suggestion. Note that the differential activation of
dMPFC in ASD subjects for the other-task was at
least in part also driven by a deactivation in control
subjects for this task (in comparison to the control
task) (see Figure 5). Enhanced emotional self-referen-
tial cognition as evidenced by vMPFC activation may
perhaps have suppressed processing in the dMPFC.
However, further studies investigating functional con-
nectivity patterns of dMPFC and vMPFC are needed
to substantiate such a claim.
Self-related emotional cognition in ASD
Besides the MPFC, ASD and control subjects also
recruited the precuneus and the adjacent PCC during
both the self- and other-tasks, and precuneus activation
was also positively correlated with empathic abilities,
Figure 5. Contrast estimates of significant between-group differences. Mean contrast estimates for the autism spectrum group (ASD) and the
control group (CS). Contrast estimates were calculated for statstically significant between-group comparisons for the other-task (A) and the
self-task (B) relative to the control condition (interaction analyses, see Table 3). Coordinates of peak activated voxels are given in MNI-space.
Contrast estimates were determined for each group separately and reflect the relative contribution of each condition to the amplitude of the
adjusted blood-oxygen-level-dependent (BOLD) signal relative to the fitted mean in the respective brain region. Note that contrast estimates
are in arbitrary units. They do not reflect an estimate of effect size and are depicted here for visualization purposes. For statistical inference, an
SPM analysis was conducted and all depicted areas were significant in an interaction contrast ([otherCS – controlCS]– [otherASD – controlASD]
or [otherASD – controlASD] – [otherCS – controlCS ] for panel A or [selfASD – controlASD] – [selfCS – controlCS] for panel B), corrected for mul-
tiple comparisons (see Table 3 and “Methods” section for further details). Error bars indicate the standard error of means; self = self-task; other
= other-task, control = control-task.16 SCHULTE-RÜTHER ET AL.
as assessed with the EQ. These regions have been
implicated in a broader range of self-referential cogni-
tive and emotional processes such as first-person per-
spective taking (Vogeley et al., 2001), representation
of the mental self (Lou et al., 2004), and autobio-
graphical memory (Piefke et al., 2008; Piefke, Weiss,
Zilles, Markowitsch, & Fink, 2003). Interestingly,
activation in these areas could be observed during
both self- and other-conditions. This pattern of results
is in accordance with other studies indicating that
overlapping brain areas are implicated in judging
other people’s and one’s own mental states, especially
in cases where the other person is perceived as similar
to oneself (Mitchell, Banaji, & Macrae, 2005; Mitch-
ell et al., 2006). Mitchell et al. (2006) conclude that
the judgment of other persons may be built on the
simulation of judging oneself. Together with these
data, our results suggest that empathizing with other
people may draw on simulation mechanisms by acti-
vating the neural networks underlying self-referential
cognitive and emotional processing. In the present
study, this idea is supported by the results of the con-
junction analysis (self- and other-tasks vs. control-
task): During both tasks, conjoint neural activation
could be observed in PCC/precuneus and MPFC
(dMPFC in ASD and vMPFC in healthy controls).
This simulation mechanism may be disturbed in indi-
viduals with ASD. In support of this conclusion, our
behavioral data demonstrate for control subjects that
the tendency for emotionally congruent responses
(self-task) was positively correlated with the ability to
correctly infer an emotion in the other person (other-
task). This was not the case in ASD subjects. Thus, in
typical adults the capacity to identify the emotions of
other people may benefit from the capacity of emo-
tional contagion. These behavioral data are also con-
sistent with the view that self-reflection may facilitate
sensitive judgments about the mental states of other
persons (Dimaggio, Lysaker, Carcione, Nicolo, &
Semerari, 2008).
We observed significantly less activation of the
vMPFC and precuneus/PCC in ASD subjects relative
to the control group. Similar aberrant activation pat-
terns in subjects with ASD have been reported for
resting state conditions (Kennedy et al., 2006), which
may be linked to automatic processes of self-referen-
tial cognition (Gusnard et al., 2001). Further evidence
for altered activation patterns in ASD in these medial
cortical areas has been observed during a task that
required subjects to make judgments about the rela-
tionship of trait adjectives to oneself or a well-known
other person (Kennedy & Courchesne, 2008). In com-
bination with these data, our results point to a defi-
ciency in the neural networks subserving self-
referential processing in ASD as one reason for
reduced empathic abilities. This may in particular be
based on dysfunctions of MPFC regions and the
precuneus/PCC. Our findings thus show a neurofunc-
tional mechanism for the frequently observed impair-
ments of self-referential cognition in ASD (Hurlburt
et al., 1994; Lombardo et al., 2007; Toichi et al.,
2002) and the related deficits in empathic behavior.
Due to a lack of self-referential emotional process-
ing (possibly resulting in diminished emotional conta-
gion), individuals with ASD may recruit different
strategies to infer emotional states of other persons.
ASD subjects showed activation in a widespread frontal
network (including mid-dorsolateral and ventrolateral
areas) and inferior temporal regions (including the
temporal poles) during the self-task (see Figure 6).
Mid-dorsolateral and ventrolateral areas of the pre-
frontal cortex have been implicated in diverse execut-
ive demands (e.g., monitoring cognitive processes and
problem solving (Duncan & Owen, 2000). These acti-
vations may reflect the need for additional cognitive
resources for resolving the cognitive–emotional
requirements of the self-task.
The ITG has been implicated in feature-based ana-
lysis of visual stimuli (Gauthier, Anderson, Tarr,
Skudlarski, & Gore, 1997). Schultz et al. (2000)
reported that ASD subjects show increased activation
in the ITG during face perception, whereas control
subjects differentially activate the fusiform gyrus, a
brain region that has been implicated in the process-
ing of configuration-related aspects of complex visual
stimuli such as faces (Gauthier, Tarr, Anderson,
Skudlarski, & Gore, 1999). Accordingly, other studies
demonstrated that individuals with ASD gain access
to complex visual displays using a feature-based strategy
that overlooks the overall configuration of the stimu-
lus (Manjaly et al., 2007). As a convergent zone for
multiple sensory modalities, the temporal poles are
involved in concept formation (Damasio, Tranel,
Grabowski, Adolphs, & Damasio, 2004) and episodic
autobiographical recollections (Piefke et al., 2003). It
is most likely that they make available semantic and
episodic materials for ongoing information processing
in the brain (Frith & Frith, 2003). Since ASD subjects
appear to have difficulties in establishing an intuitive
emotional link to other persons, one may speculate
that they activate these additional regions in an effortful
attempt to make sense of the other’s emotional facial
expression with reference to themselves, for
example, by recruiting their personal memories of
past emotional interactions with other people. Note,
however, that ITG and temporal poles did not show
significantly higher activations for ASD subjects in the
direct statistical comparison to controls. Thus, definiteBRAIN CORRELATES OF EMPATHY IN AUTISM 17
conclusions regarding the involvement of ITG and
temporal poles in compensatory strategies will require
further investigation.
Mirror mechanisms
The human mirror system (hMS) may play an import-
ant role in social cognition, especially in the context
of emotional face-to-face interactions (Carr et al.,
2003; Dapretto et al., 2006; Schulte-Rüther et al.,
2007; but also see Hickok, 2009, for a critique). In
support of this notion, we demonstrate that areas pre-
viously associated with the hMS (e.g., BA44/45 in the
IFC) are activated when empathy is elicited by facial
expressions of emotions. It is currently a matter of
debate whether an early deficiency of the hMS in
individuals with ASD may lead to their typical social
and emotional deficits (Williams et al., 2001).
Dapretto et al. (2006) demonstrated that children with
ASD show less activation in frontal components of
the hMS during the observation and imitation of emo-
tional facial expressions. However, children with
ASD are not necessarily impaired in the understand-
ing and imitation of non-emotional actions (Hamilton,
Brindley, & Frith, 2007). Furthermore, it remains
unclear at which level of imitative process problems
may arise in individuals with ASD (Southgate &
Hamilton, 2008). It has thus been argued that the
claim of a direct link between imitation deficits and a
core dysfunction of the mirror system in autism is
speculative, to date. In the present study, we did not
observe a significant difference between the two
groups in the IFC (BA44/45) at the selected statistical
threshold, in either the self- or the other-task. There
was right-hemispheric activation in the IFC (BA44/
45) during the other-task in the control group, but no
activation above threshold in ASD subjects. In the
self-task, however, left-hemispheric activation in
frontal parts of the hMS was evident in ASD subjects
as well. In adults with ASD, components of the hMS
may thus become engaged in emotional face-to-face
Figure 6. Brain activity during the self task (vs. high-level baseline) for ASD subjects and control subjects. SPMs are thresholded at p < .05,
corrected for multiple comparison at the cluster level (p < .001 voxel level).18 SCHULTE-RÜTHER ET AL.
interactions especially when subjects are explicitly
instructed to attend to their own emotional reaction to
other people’s emotions. The data suggest that ASD
does not necessarily affect basic functions of the
hMS. Rather, hMS recruitment during social interac-
tion appears to be modulated by a combination of
task, context, and instruction in individuals with ASD.
Further studies are needed to clarify under which cir-
cumstances aberrant activations in the hMS may
occur in ASD subjects and under which circum-
stances hMS function in this patient group is compa-
rable to that of control subjects.
Limitations
Several potential limitations of the paradigm should
be kept in mind. Our choice of computerized faces
warranted high naturalism and optimum standardiza-
tion of stimuli. More natural stimuli (e.g., videoclips
of emotional faces in a naturalistic context) may
perhaps trigger stronger empathic reactions; however,
they are not well controlled experimentally. Potential
differences between computerized facial stimuli and
real faces have not been investigated in ASD yet, and
should be explored in future studies. For example,
ASD subjects might find it harder to empathize with a
computerized person, and perceive such persons as
more dissimilar to themselves. Such effects could
contribute to our observed dorsal/ventral dissociation
in MPFC (Mitchell et al., 2005, 2006).
An important aspect of the paradigm is that the
behavioral responses during the self-task can be
interpreted as an index of emotional contagion.
Though this self-report response might be biased
(e.g. by social desirability), our interpretation of
reduced emotional contagion in ASD is in line with
several previous studies (Scambler et al., 2007;
Baron-Cohen & Wheelwright, 2004). Furthermore, a
recent study systematically investigated social desir-
ability bias in subjects with Asperger syndrome and
control subjects, and found no group differences
(Dziobek et al., 2008). However, more objective mea-
sures of emotional contagion (e.g. skin conductance, video
recordings of facial reactions) should be employed in
future studies to rule out such potential biases. Another
issue related to the self-task refers to conditions of alexi-
thymia. Subjects suffering from alexithymia have pro-
found difficulties in verbalizing and identifying their
own emotional states. It has been suggested that there
may be an overlap between ASD and alexithymia with
respect to social difficulties, affective interaction, and
emotional awareness. (Fitzgerald & Bellgrove, 2006).
However, fMRI studies did not reveal a direct relation-
ship between difficulties in emotional awareness and
self-reflection and mentalizing (Silani et al., 2008).
Future studies should therefore investigate the role of
alexithymia in ASD in more detail.
CONCLUSION
The present data provide novel insights into the brain
networks involved in explicit emotional self-reference
and emotion identification, two processes closely
related to empathy. Furthermore, we demonstrate
atypical neural activation associated with these proc-
esses in individuals with ASD. Importantly, our find-
ings support the idea of a ventral–dorsal
neurofunctional segregation in the MPFC. Atypical
MPFC function during emotional face-to-face interac-
tions in individuals with ASD may at least in part con-
tribute to the impairment in self-referential emotional
processing associated with the disease.
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